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49 People Should Not Have Died on Irish Roads in the First Five Months of 2026

    Seventy‑one people have now died on Irish roads in the first five months of 2026 — an increase on last year, which already had the highest death toll in seventeen years. Despite this worsening trend, neither the Road Safety Authority nor the junior minister with responsibility for road safety, Seán Canney, has shown any evidence of understanding how to reverse it.

    In January 2026, I wrote to the minister asking why the RSA continues to rely on the failed Safety I model and why Ireland has not adopted Safety II, the approach used by Sweden — the international leader in road‑safety performance. Weeks later, I received a reply from a civil servant claiming that Ireland had adopted Safety II.

    The evidence on the ground says otherwise.

    I wrote back, pointing out that recent road works in Galway had increased the risk to all road users, the exact opposite of what a Safety II system is supposed to achieve. Here is an extract from that correspondence:

    The Road Safety Authority advertising campaigns continue to focus predominantly on individual behaviour. While these campaigns are intuitive and well‑intentioned, international evidence increasingly shows that behaviour‑focused interventions alone are insufficient, and that safety engineering and system‑design expertise play a critical role.

    You have indicated that Transport Infrastructure Ireland (TII) and the National Transport Authority (NTA) hold responsibility in respect of Safety‑II implementation. However, recent experience in Galway raises questions about how this responsibility is exercised in practice.

    A recent road improvement project delivered by Galway City Council has, according to councillors and bus operators, introduced increased risk for pedestrians and cyclists. Concerns were raised during the planning process regarding carriageway widths, with reports that in some locations, buses have as little as eight centimetres of clearance when passing. Such conditions leave minimal tolerance for error and create understandable concern for vulnerable road users.

    While the project aimed to deliver a safe and attractive cycling and pedestrian corridor along Ballybane Road and Castlepark Road, Galway City Councillors have indicated that this aim has not been met. Instead, the level of risk for all road users has increased.

    In addition, the removal of bus lay‑bys has resulted in buses stopping in live traffic lanes, contributing to traffic congestion, and potentially increasing the likelihood of risky overtaking behaviour.

    In response, the Galway City Council executive has stated that the scheme is fully compliant with National Transport Authority standards, while also noting that these standards do not permit funding for bus lay‑bys. This raises a broader question as to whether full compliance with existing standards is always sufficient to deliver genuinely safe outcomes on the ground.

    These issues suggest that while TII and the NTA provide funding and standards frameworks, there may be gaps in safety oversight and in the assurance of safety‑led design outcomes. This can leave local authorities operating within narrow compliance parameters that do not always align with best practice in safety engineering.

    Concerns have also been raised locally regarding the value for money of certain scheme elements, including the construction of two roadside parklets at a reported cost of €250,000. The explanation given—it was no loss to the city council as the funding was provided by the NTA—highlights the need for clearer accountability and scrutiny in how public funds are allocated and justified.

    The experience in Galway appears to reflect broader challenges encountered across local authorities nationally.

    Taken together, current outputs from government and its agencies suggest that a Safety‑I mindset continues to dominate, and that the transition to Safety‑II is either progressing very slowly or lacks sufficient institutional momentum. The continuing rise in road fatalities underscores the seriousness of this issue.

    The city’s council executive defended their works saying that the National Trasport Authority NTA did not fund bus lay-bys.

    And part of the problem is structural: even the national transport bodies — TII and the NTA — now publish policy documents that aspire to Safety‑II principles, emphasising system design, human factors, and risk‑reducing infrastructure. But these aspirations never reach the ground. Local authorities, who actually design and deliver the roads people use, are neither required to adopt the new methods nor held accountable when they ignore them. The result is a fragmented system where national agencies talk about modern safety science while county engineers continue to apply outdated, Safety‑I thinking. Until the government forces alignment between policy and practice, Ireland will keep hiring the wrong people and getting the wrong outcomes.

    Successive Irish governments continue to hire the wrong people for road‑safety leadership because the system rewards administrative compliance rather than technical competence. The RSA and the Department prioritise insiders who can “manage stakeholders” and produce glossy strategies, not specialists who understand systems engineering, human factors, or Safety‑II principles. As a result, the people making decisions are often those least equipped to challenge outdated assumptions or redesign dangerous infrastructure. The outcome is predictable: Ireland keeps recycling the same failed approaches while countries like Sweden hire multidisciplinary experts who actually understand how complex systems fail — and how to prevent deaths rather than explain them after the fact.

    References

    Garda (Police) Traffic fatalities as of the 29 May 2026 Note: two more died over the bank holiday weekend bringing the total to 71 for the first five months from 1 Jan to 31 May 2026 inclusive.

    RoadDeaths.ie currently estimates the total at around 80 fatalities, but their system relies on automated scraping of online news reports. That method inevitably produces noise: not every collision is reported in the media, some are reported multiple times, and others are misclassified. Without human verification, the figure is almost certainly inaccurate and should not be treated as a reliable official count.

    Both the above update as the year goes on, so will be showing a higher total as 2026 progresses.

    A further caveat is needed when using Garda figures: people who are seriously injured in a collision may die weeks or even months later. When that happens, their death is recorded in the month they die, not the month of the crash. This means the monthly totals can shift upwards long after the original incident, and the apparent pattern for any given month may under‑represent the true level of fatal collisions that occurred during that period.

    ‘Absolute disaster’ of Active Travel scheme in Ballybane & Castlepark to be completed ahead of schedule

    ‘No margin for error’ – How a Galway road’s new layout leaves just 8cm between passing buses

    Ballybane roadworks ‘disaster’ is slammed

    Ongoing works at Ballybane and Castlepark described as “nightmare”

    Galway City Council Observations on the Proposed … For indepth view on how the council swatted away the public and city councillor’s concerns.

    Cite this article
    Jordan, Eugene. "49 People Should Not Have Died on Irish Roads in the First Five Months of 2026." Institutional Systems Analysis. 2026. Accessed on November 18, 2026 at 08:25. https://eugenejordan.ie/49-people-should-not-have-died-on-irish-roads-in-the-first-five-months-of-2026/.
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