The Irish Road Safety Authority is not, in practice, functioning as a successful safety organisation. In 2026, road deaths continue to rise despite strenuous efforts to reverse the trend. Yet few people question the underlying strategy. This is understandable because road safety, like all areas of safety engineering, is profoundly counterintuitive. Most people instinctively believe that accidents occur because individuals have poor abilities combined with poor attitudes. History shows otherwise.
Blaming road users is a natural human response to tragedy, but safety engineering has repeatedly demonstrated the limitations of that approach. When the same types of accidents continue to occur under similar circumstances, the problem is rarely explained by individual behaviour alone. Aviation learned this lesson decades ago. Unlike road safety, aviation safety cannot afford the luxury of failure.
There is an old engineering maxim that “safety lessons are learned in the graveyard.” It reflects the uncomfortable reality that deficiencies in safety systems often become apparent only after lives have been lost. In Ireland, however, the response to fatalities too often appears to be an intensification of warning campaigns and accusatory advertising directed at road users, particularly drivers. While understandable, that approach mistakes symptoms for causes.
Competent safety practitioners recognise that effective safety strategies must account for the fact that human beings are fallible. People will always make mistakes. The central question is not how to eliminate human error, but how to design systems that prevent those errors from resulting in death or serious injury. This philosophy is known as Safety II.
Many European countries have embraced Safety II principles with considerable success. The approach accepts human error as inevitable and seeks to create roads, infrastructure and traffic systems that are resilient to those errors. The focus shifts from assigning blame after collisions occur to designing environments that reduce the likelihood and severity of collisions in the first place.
I wrote to the Minister of State with responsibility for road safety urging the adoption of Safety II principles. While the RSA and Transport Infrastructure Ireland TFI who both reference Safety II in various publications, the evidence suggests that implementation remains limited, if at all.
Consider Galway City, where a newly constructed cycle lane reportedly placed cyclists within centimetres of passing traffic. At one point, the removal of a bus lay-by forces buses to stop in a live traffic lane, creating conditions that encourage risky overtaking manoeuvres. At Mincloon Cross, a location with a history of collisions, a crash barrier was installed to prevent vehicles from plunging into an adjacent field. Within weeks it had been struck and proved to be a cosmetic as it failed completely. For years afterwards, the barrier remained compromised while further vehicles ended up in the field their rear end facing skyward.
Transport Infrastructure Ireland has adopted standards derived from UK guidance that specify the containment levels and impact forces road barriers must withstand, depending on the type of road. Yet many local roads appear not to benefit from the same level of safety scrutiny. This inconsistency raises important questions about how safety standards are applied and enforced across the network.
The underlying problem is that much of Ireland’s road safety policy remains rooted in the traditional Safety I model, which relies heavily on enforcement, public messaging, and the assumption that accidents can be prevented by changing behaviour. While enforcement is an essential component of any road safety strategy, it is not sufficient on its own. By its nature, Safety I is largely reactive, learning from failures after they occur. Safety II takes a different approach. It recognises that human error is inevitable and seeks to design roads and traffic systems that are resilient to those errors. Rather than focusing solely on preventing mistakes, it aims to ensure that mistakes do not result in death or serious injury. That is why Safety II offers a more sophisticated and ultimately more effective framework for improving road safety.
Responsibility for driving this transition ultimately rests with government. Ministers, agencies and road authorities must ensure that modern safety principles are not merely referenced in policy documents but implemented in practice. The question is not whether road users sometimes make mistakes. They always will. The question is whether our roads are designed with that reality in mind.
Why do we continue to accept underperformance when better approaches are already available?
