Skip to content

Two Parklets – €250,000

    Two flower boxes with benches became a multi-consultant infrastructure project.

    Small urban interventions often reveal more about how institutions function than large projects ever could. The installation of two street parklets in Galway provides a useful example. What might appear at first glance to be a modest public-realm improvement, essentially seating platforms with planting, ultimately became a project costing close to a quarter of a million euro. The episode illustrates how the structure through which projects are delivered can shape costs as much as the physical infrastructure itself.

    Institutional Capacity and Outsourced Delivery

    The parklet episode also highlights a structural feature of contemporary local government administration: the extensive outsourcing of technical and operational capacity. Even relatively modest urban interventions may involve multiple external providers for functions that earlier municipal administrations often performed internally. In this instance, consultancy engineering, architectural design, fabrication, surveying, landscaping, and installation were all delivered through separate private contractors.

    The result is a project structure in which a local authority may act primarily as a commissioning and coordinating body, rather than as a direct provider of technical or craft expertise. While this model can provide access to specialist skills, it also introduces additional layers of consultancy, procurement, and project management, each carrying its own costs. For small-scale interventions such as parklets, the cumulative effect of these layers can significantly increase project expenditure relative to the physical scale of the infrastructure being delivered.

    Viewed from a systems perspective, the issue is therefore less the price of any individual component than the delivery architecture through which relatively simple projects are executed.

    The Parklet Programme: Cost, Capacity, and Delivery in Galway City Council

    The financial scale of the project emerged following a Freedom of Information request reported by Dara Bradley in the Galway City Tribune (“No Such Thing as a Cheap Seat!”, 30 June 2023). Documents released to the newspaper showed that invoices totalling approximately €153,800 had already been paid by Galway City Council for the parklets installed on Middle Street and Dominick Street. A further €80,000 in invoices had not yet been submitted at the time of the request, bringing the expected total cost of the two installations to around €250,000.

    The invoices reveal how the project was structured. Payments were made to several contractors covering structural engineering consultancy, architectural design, surveying, fabrication, landscaping, and installation. Among the firms involved were John Britton Consulting for structural engineering services, A2 Architects for consultancy work related to parklets and bicycle stands, Apex Surveys Ltd for site surveys, Kent Stainless Wexford Ltd for fabrication of the parklet structures, Colas Contracting Ltd for line marking, and Radharc Landscaping for planting works.

    The largest payments were made to Kent Stainless Wexford Ltd through staged invoices linked to design approval and manufacturing. These included advance payments of around twenty percent for each parklet followed by further payments on approval of fabrication drawings before goods were released into manufacturing.

    On paper the project followed a familiar procurement model: specialist consultants design, contractors fabricate and install, and the local authority oversees the process. In practice, however, the structure reveals something more significant about how contemporary local government projects are delivered.

    A flower box with benches became a multi-consultant infrastructure project.

    Even relatively modest interventions can now pass through a layered delivery system involving multiple professional services. Engineering consultancy, architectural design, surveys, fabrication contracts, landscaping works and street alterations may each be procured separately. Every layer adds expertise, but it also adds cost, coordination, and procedural overhead.

    The parklets illustrate this phenomenon clearly. The physical infrastructure involved is not technically complex: raised seating platforms, integrated planting, and protective barriers between pedestrians and traffic. Yet the project structure resembles that used for far larger infrastructure schemes. When consultancy, fabrication, surveys, and installation are all procured separately, the cost of managing the project can grow rapidly relative to the scale of what is being built.

    The contrast with similar projects in other Irish local authorities is instructive. Cork City Council introduced parklets as part of its own public-realm programme using comparatively modest installations built largely from timber structures with integrated seating and planters. These units were delivered at significantly lower cost per installation. Similarly, Fingal County Council installed parklets as part of outdoor dining initiatives during the pandemic period at a fraction of the cost associated with the Galway project.

    The comparison is not exact, design specifications, materials, and site conditions vary, but the scale of the difference raises legitimate questions about project delivery structures and procurement choices. When broadly similar urban interventions produce widely different costs across local authorities, the explanation is rarely found in the price of materials alone. It usually lies in the way the project is organised and delivered.

    If a flower box with benches requires architects, engineers, surveys, fabrication contracts, and staged payments, something has gone wrong with the system.

    In Galway’s case, the documentation suggests a delivery structure built around multiple layers of external consultancy and fabrication. Structural engineers design, architects advise, surveyors measure, contractors fabricate, landscapers plant, and installers assemble. The local authority itself functions primarily as the coordinating body overseeing this chain of suppliers.

    This model reflects a broader trend in public administration: the gradual shift of technical and operational capacity from inside institutions to external consultancy networks. Local authorities increasingly operate as project commissioners rather than as direct providers of technical expertise.

    That shift raises a structural question. If relatively simple urban installations require multiple layers of consultancy and fabrication, where does core technical capacity reside?

    The issue is not that consultants are used; complex infrastructure often requires specialist expertise. The issue arises when the delivery structure of even modest projects begins to resemble that of major infrastructure programmes. At that point, the cumulative effect of procurement, consultancy, and project management layers can outweigh the physical scale of the project itself.

    In such systems inefficiency rarely appears as a single dramatic error. It emerges gradually, through routine processes that seem individually reasonable but collectively expensive.

    A project designed to add seating to a street becomes an exercise in institutional architecture.

    Public reaction to the parklets reflected this tension. Some local representatives welcomed the installations as part of a broader effort to improve the public realm and create more pedestrian-friendly urban spaces. Others questioned the value for money once the scale of the expenditure became known. Prior to the FOI disclosure, the detailed costs of the installations had not been publicly available.

    The debate that followed focused largely on the merits of the parklets themselves, their appearance, usefulness, and impact on the street environment. Yet the more interesting question lies elsewhere. The real issue is not whether parklets are desirable pieces of urban furniture, but how a project of such modest physical scale came to require such an elaborate delivery structure.

    Institutional systems rarely fail spectacularly. More often they drift into patterns where complexity accumulates and costs rise quietly in the background.

    The Galway parklets illustrate how that process works. What began as a simple public-realm intervention became a layered procurement exercise involving multiple consultants, contractors, and stages of project certification. By the time the final invoices were counted, the cost of two small street installations approached a quarter of a million euro.

    When simple things become expensive, the explanation is seldom found in the price of materials. It is usually found in the system that delivers them.

    Lessons from the Parklet Programme: Institutional Capacity and Project Delivery

    The Galway parklet episode is instructive not because the infrastructure itself is controversial but because it reveals how relatively simple projects can acquire disproportionate cost through the institutional systems used to deliver them. When a modest intervention such as street seating and planting approaches the financial scale of a major urban improvement, the question is not whether individual invoices were justified but whether the delivery structure itself is proportionate to the task.

    Several lessons emerge from the case.

    1. Proportionality in Project Delivery

    The most obvious lesson concerns proportionality. Not every urban intervention requires the same delivery architecture. Large infrastructure schemes involving bridges, flood defences, or major roadworks naturally require multiple layers of design, engineering review, and specialist consultancy. Small-scale public-realm interventions should not necessarily follow the same model.

    In the parklet case, the delivery structure involved architects, structural engineers, surveyors, fabricators, landscapers, and contractors. Each role may have been reasonable in isolation, but together they produced a project architecture resembling that used for far larger works. When the delivery framework of a minor intervention resembles that of a major capital project, cost escalation becomes almost inevitable.

    The lesson is simple: delivery structures should scale with the complexity of the project.

    2. Internal Technical Capacity

    The episode also raises questions about the balance between internal capability and outsourced expertise in local government. Modern public administrations frequently rely on external consultants to provide specialised technical services. This approach can be efficient when dealing with complex engineering problems that require specialist expertise not available within the organisation.

    However, when relatively simple projects require multiple layers of external consultancy, it suggests that the institution may have lost certain forms of routine technical capacity. Municipal administrations historically possessed practical capabilities in areas such as basic design, surveying, cost estimation, and small-scale construction supervision.

    When these capabilities disappear entirely from within the organisation, even modest projects must be assembled through procurement exercises involving external firms. The result is not simply higher consultancy costs but a project structure in which every step must pass through formal contracting and certification processes.

    The lesson is not that outsourcing should be avoided entirely. Rather, local authorities should maintain a core level of in-house technical capability sufficient to design and deliver small-scale public-realm projects without needing a full consultancy chain.

    3. Cost Benchmarking

    Another lesson concerns comparative benchmarking. When similar interventions are undertaken across multiple local authorities, large differences in cost should trigger internal review. The parklet installations in Cork and Fingal demonstrate that similar urban furniture can be delivered at substantially lower cost depending on design choices, materials, and delivery methods.

    Benchmarking does not necessarily require identical designs, but it does provide an important reference point. If the cost of delivering a similar intervention in one authority is several times higher than elsewhere, the question should not simply be whether the project complied with procurement rules. The more relevant question is why the delivery structure produced such a different outcome.

    Public institutions often focus on procedural compliance rather than comparative efficiency. Yet compliance alone does not guarantee value for money. A procurement process can be perfectly lawful and still produce an unnecessarily expensive result.

    4. Design Simplicity

    Urban design projects often accumulate complexity through attempts to create bespoke or highly customised installations. While distinctive design can contribute to place-making, it can also increase fabrication costs and require specialist manufacturing processes.

    In contrast, simpler modular designs, particularly those using standard materials, can dramatically reduce costs and allow easier maintenance or replacement. Many successful parklet programmes internationally rely on relatively simple timber or modular systems precisely because they can be installed, repaired, and adapted at low cost.

    The lesson is that simplicity is often the most economical form of urban design.

    5. Institutional Learning

    Finally, the most important lesson concerns institutional learning. Organisations often treat individual controversies as isolated episodes rather than as opportunities to examine systemic patterns. When problems arise, the typical response is to add additional procedures, documentation requirements, or approval stages.

    This approach creates the appearance of reform while leaving the underlying delivery architecture unchanged. Over time, procedural layers accumulate while the basic structural dynamics that produced the problem remain intact.

    Effective institutional learning requires something different: a willingness to examine whether the system used to deliver projects is itself appropriate for the scale of work being undertaken.

    If simple projects consistently produce complex delivery chains, the issue lies not in the individual projects but in the institutional system that produces them.

    Avoiding Future Problems

    Avoiding similar outcomes in the future does not require radical structural change. Several practical steps could significantly improve project delivery for small-scale urban interventions:

    • maintaining limited in-house design and technical capacity for minor public-realm works;
    • using standardised modular designs where appropriate;
    • conducting systematic cost benchmarking against comparable authorities;
    • applying simplified procurement pathways for low-complexity projects.

    Taken together, these measures would allow local authorities to reserve full consultancy-based delivery structures for projects that genuinely require them.

    The broader lesson of the parklet episode is therefore not about seating platforms or street furniture. It concerns the relationship between institutional systems and the scale of the projects they are used to deliver.

    When simple things become complicated, institutions should ask whether the system itself has become too elaborate for the work it is meant to perform.

    The parklets are small monuments to the complexity of the system that produced them.

    Cite this article
    Jordan, Eugene. "Two Parklets – €250,000." Institutional Systems Analysis. 2026. Accessed on November 18, 2026 at 08:00. https://eugenejordan.ie/two-parklets-e250000/.